

EXHIBIT NO. 116 Doc. 1632 W-105

木 戸 保 管 日 記

昭和十九年一月六日(水) 晴

午前十時出勤

十一時松平官長ト鶴乙ノ運命ト其ノ後ニ於ル情
勢ニ鑑スル日本ノ動向ニツキ詫ス。尙研究ヲ依
頼ス。

FILL COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Dec 16 32

一九・一・六

昭和十九年新春ニ當り、旅ルベキ一ヶ年ノ途終ヲ
考フルニ何ト言フモ與國待遇ノ運命方最モ問題ナ
リ、眞ニ一年間過方極目シ、遂シテ或ひニ尊バセ
支ノ餘力ヲ有スルニ於テハ事態ハ大ニ緩和セラレ
ルモ、若シ萬一本年内ニ待遇ノ崩壊ヲ見セ方如キ
コトアランカ、我國ノ立場ハ眞ニ危窮亦亡ト言ハ
ズルベカラズ。如新事態ノ產生ヲ信スルニハア
ラザレド萬一ノ場合ヲ考観シ之方對策ヲ研究シ置
クノ要アリト思フ。

先づ第一ニ考ヘズルベカラザルハ待遇ガ崩壊即チ
無條件降服シタル場合日本モ同時ニ戰爭終結ニ導
ク手ヲ打ツヤ否ヤナリ。

此點ニツイテハ日本ハ眞當時ノ情ニヨリ獨自ノ
判断ニヨリ行動スペキハ勿論トス。

但シ此場合敵ノ政治諭旨ノ大致ヲ受クベキハ當
然ニシテ從ツテ國內ニ於テモ所謂パドリオノ壁隔
出スペキヲ以テ此ノ對策ガ最モ戒心ヲ要スルトコ

2.
一 太平洋ノ問題ハ太平洋ニ高メル主要國ニ於テ之
ヲ處理ス。

一 日露文米英ヲ以テ委員會ヲ組織ス。

一 我國ノ占領セル地域及太平洋ニアル艦隊ハ非武
裝地帶トス。

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2.

ロナルベシ。

如新事態ノ發生シタル場合長官内閣ノ存續ハ相當困難ヲ豫想セラルベキ方達タルニ至リタル場合從來通り重臣會議ニ謀リテ後繼者ヲ奏請スルノミニテ果シテ充分ナリヤ否ヤハ問題ナリ。

寧口此ノ段階ニ達シタル場合ニハ後繼者ヲ推舉スルニ先テ今後日本ノ進行スペキ大体ノ外交方針ヲ重臣會議ニ決定シ、之ヲ實施ノ任ニ當ルベキ内閣ヲ奏請スルモ一案ニアザルノ研究スペキ一問題ナリ。

次ニ如此事態トナリタル場合ニハ相當大體ニ謀歩シタル宗ニアザレバ之カ成立ノ見込ナシト信ズ而シ大東亜戰爭ノ開始ハ所謂 A B C D ノ包囲体制ノ打破ニアリタルハ宣戰ノ御詔書ニモ四ナルトコロナレバ之レガ目的ヲ達成シ得レバ一體ノ結果ニ到達シタルモノト言フコトヲ得ベシ。

即チ此眞點ヨリ大体左ノ如キ矣ヲ考慮シ得ベシ。

一太平洋ノ問題ハ太平洋ニ臨メル主要國ニ於テ之ヲ處理ス。

一日本支米英ヲ以テ法員會ヲ組織ス。

一我國ノ占領セシ島嶼及太平洋ニアル艦隊ハ非或該地帶トス。

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3.

一此地域ニ存在スル主英國以外ノ獨立國（洲洲國）ヲ除クハ瑞西ノ如キ宗主中立トス、其他ノ占領地ハ右主要國ノ混合委員會ニテ處理スベコトトス。

一此地域ノ經濟政策ハ原則トシテ自由互惠會均等トス。

本宗ヲ如何ナル時期ニ如何アル方法ニヨリ操縦スルカガ憂モ慎重ニ研究スベキ問題ナルガ一時期ハ獨逸ノ崩壊ト同時トセバ而カモ米英蘇ガ一歎シテ日本ニ當ラザル以前ヲ可トスベシ。

方法ハ蘇ヲシテ仲介セシムルヲ可トスベシ。

以上ノ舉ハ一見餘リニ讀テ該國ナリト思ヘル、ヤモ知レザレド然ラ今後ノ世界ノ大勢ヲ鑒識スルニ支那事變、日ソ戰ノ近應、流空機ノ普及、米蘇ノ實力等ヨリ見又我國力ノ位置ナル精詳ニシミ今後一世紀位ハ實ニ内ニ實力ヲ發フノ時ナリト思考ス。若シ此判断ニシテ誤リナクンバ此際我國が孤立シ有色人種トシテ世界ヨリ隔離セラルルハ最モ邊ケザルベカラザルトコロニシテ此深點ヨリスルモアンダロサクソシタル米英ニ對スルニ大体東洋的ナル潔文ト聲揚シ齒齧處ノ急勞ヲ體ヘヒソカニ内ニ實力ヲ發フルヲ最モ欲ノ體タルモノナリト信ズ。

Entry for 17 July 1944 from KIDO's Diary

17 July (Monday) clear

At 12.20 A.M. Premier TOJO came to my house and explained the Cabinet policy as is given in the separate paper. I acknowledged it.

At 8 Mr. HIROSE called, and I listened to information from all quarters.

Received in audience from 9.40 to 10.20. I reported to the Throne on the policy which Premier TOJO talked about.

At 10.30 Minister of State, KISHI, came to the office. He told me that he had been requested to resign There by Premier TOJO, and he asked me for advice as to deciding was a how he should move. He said that he had come to me for talk advice after obtaining the Premier's consent. At 11.30, as is Chief of the Imperial Guards, NAKAMURA came to the office. Given At 2 o'clock, Premier TOJO came to the office after his in the audience with the Emperor. Talked to me about appointing General UMEZU as Chief of the Army General Staff.

Received in audience from 2.40 to 2.50. Went to the official residence at 3 o'clock, and had a talk with Mr. HIROSE and with Prince KONOYE at 4. Came home late in the afternoon. Received "SHITAIJITSU" /T.N. Type of physical culture remedy./ from Mr. TAKAHASHI. At 8, OKADA came. Had a talk with him. Admiral OKADA came at 9.30.

At 9.30 P.M. on 17 July, 1944, Admiral Keisuke OKADA called and talked to me as follows:

1. A Senior Statesmen's council was held at Baron HIRANUMA's house today.

1. Those who attended were Messrs. WAKATSUKI, OKADA, HIRANUMA, HIROTA, ABE, KONOYE and YONAI.

1. Mr. WAKATSUKI is made chairman, and he begins to talk first. This Cabinet has completely lost the sympathy of the public; and he thinks that the present situation is really serious. He asks for opinions.

1. YONAI: The matter /T.N. portion illegible/ has been under discussion since the 13th, and after careful

consideration, I have written declining the offer. As OKA, Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau came and talked to me about the general opinion of the Navy and all, I replied that it would be reasonable for me to be returned to active service again and serve as Supreme War Councillor or in any other capacity; but that even if I entered the Cabinet as Minister of State I could be of little service, and that it would not be the thing to do. I have no intention of joining the Cabinet.

ABE: Although the people are completely out of sympathy with this Cabinet, the situation would become more difficult if it were replaced by a still weaker Cabinet. We must think about such points. As President of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, I must decide my attitude according to the attitude of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society.

HIRANUMA: Whether the Cabinet is overthrown or not, or whether the next Cabinet will be a weak one or not is not the point. The point is that we are really concerned about our country, and we must make up our minds to do something.

HIROTA: I also was asked to help by KARASAWA who talked about diplomatic policy vis a vis the Soviet Union, but no one has talked to me since then. Even if I were asked to, I should not join the Cabinet.

Questions and answers were exchanged between OKADA and ABE over the question of the Navy. Finally the following decision was made and the meeting adjourned.

Accordingly, I asked him /T.N. OKADA/ if I might understand by the above talk that I have been given information concerning the gathering of the senior statesmen, that is, if I might take it that he had come with the intention of keeping contact, and as he replied in the affirmative, I acknowledged that such was the case. I asked him because I thought that I should have to give careful consideration, if he intended to ask me to report it to the Emperor.

"In order to find our way through the current difficult situation, it is necessary to renew the popular mind. All people must rally and cooperate to build a powerful national Cabinet which will surge forward unswervingly. A partial reorganization of the cabinet will not be of any use."

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At 12.20 on 17 July, 1944, Premier TOJO called and explained the Cabinet policy which may be summed up as follows:

"As we are told of the Emperor's intention regarding the three points to which the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal called attention some time ago, we have decided to carry out the consolidation of the Supreme Command as well as a change of Navy Ministers. I had a talk with the candidate for Navy Minister, Admiral Naokuni NOMURA, tonight, and we agreed."

"When we decided our policy at first, we were not thinking of the question of the Supreme Command. But things have reached a point where this has had to be taken into consideration because of the general situation, since it was feared that a state might arise in which there would be insufficient unity between Army and Navy. From this point of view, we have changed our policy on reorganization of Cabinet and other problems to minimum.

"Reinforcement of Headquarters. The Liaison Conference which has been inclined to be businesslike and has not been made use of to the fullest extent, shall be renovated and strengthened. It shall consist of two ministers of state of the Premier class (ABE and YONAI considered) besides both Chiefs of Staff and the Minister of War and Navy, Munitions, Finance and the Foreign Minister.

Cabinet reorganization.

"In order to strengthen the air force, FUJIWARA shall serve full time as Minister of Munitions, and, therefore, we request retirement of Mr. KISIFI as Minister of State. MAEDA or SHIMADA shall be appointed Welfare Minister in order to have a member of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society in the Cabinet. General ABE and Admiral YONAI will be asked to join the Cabinet as Ministers of State in order to reinforce the Imperial Headquarters."

In connection with the Senior Statesmen:

"We are prepared to consider the revival of the Cabinet Advisory system, if it is desired by the Senior Statesmen. Hereafter, the Cabinet members shall always keep close contact with the Senior Statesmen and fully reflect their intentions."

In connection with the Imperial Rule Assistance
Political Society:

"The advisory set-up shall be divided into two
departments, technical and political, and five advisors
shall be appointed from among the members of the House
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木戸侯日記ヨリ抜萃(昭和九年七月十七日)

七月十七日(金)晴

Ex 1277 W (106)

于前零時平介事條首相來即内閣、方針以キ別紙通リ説明アリ
一應諒承ス。

八時廣瀬氏來訪各方面情報ヲ聽ク。

九時半十分ヨリ十時二十分止拜謁東條首相ヨリ詰アリハ方針宣言
十時半岸國相來宣旨相手詳職要求アリ出立遅延ニシテ相談アリ
Dcc 余、相談の首相=諒解を得テトトナリ。十一時半中村警衛
局長来室三時聚條首相拜謁後来宣總長梅津大將云々上詰アリ
二時半分ヨリ同五十分止拜謁。三時官舎至。廣瀬氏同四時近正公
上面談多方帰宅。

高橋氏正体術アリス

八時加田来訪面談九時半周田大將太郎別紙如上詰アリ
昭和十九年六月十七日下午九時半周田啓介大將來訪在要
旨、詰アリタ。

一本日平沼男郎三洋重臣、會合ノ制限アリ

參集者若槻國田、平沼、云田、河部、小衛門内、各氏。

若槻氏座長ト、先づ發言。此、内閣人心全般及セ。

而して時局、眞に甚大ナリ考へ御意見ヲ承リタ。

一米内十三日以来(以下數字不明)

交渉アリシラ以テ熟慮、二御断入書キテ復シ多聞軍務
局長來リ海軍、御意云々云々故自力カ海軍三艦云々アリ
ハ現役復帰シテ軍事參議官ナリ少佐、リ了勵、十七判事
國務大臣トシテ入閣、其元何、力モアラバシハ筋が違アラバヤ

Dec 16 32 W (106)

上答へ置キ行自命八入港、音思十三

阿部此内閣が人心ヲ失ヒ居心トスルモニ二三事ニ更ニ賄體十九モ、かち
未テハ益々時局ハ困難トビシ、ノ等、モ芳彦セサルベカラバ自
分ハ賄政會總裁トバ賄政會、態度ニヨリ去就ヲ決セサルベラズ
平沼外相倒ストカ倒サストカ或ハ次、内閣が賄體トナ何トカ云
コトハ問題ニアラ大真三國ノ憂ラシカ故ニ何等カ決意ヲナサ
ルベカラズト思フ

尼山自命三モ唐澤ヨリ援助ヲ求メ、計リ外交云々等、
詰モアリシ其後何、交渉モナシ自命ハ交渉下モ内閣セサルベシ
岡田ト阿部ト、同ニ海軍問題ヲナリ、應酬アリシが最後次
如キ決定オシ散會入

体テ余翁、御詰、重臣、御集、ニ開き情報ヲ承リ多々意
解ス即キ連絡、意味ニテ御去トリタリ解シ可然ヤト内然
リ、答ナリニ該諒承セリ余ニヲ賛ムナル所以ハ上恭、休頤、意
思ナリトスレ慎重、考慮ヲ要スト考ヘタリ以テアリ
此、難局ヲ切抜ケルハ人心ヲ新ニスルコトガ必至テゴサイミス國
民全部が相知シ相協力ニ一路萬達至強、力ナリ舉國一致内
閣ヲ作コトが山西ト考ヘス内閣、一部改造、如キハ何役元

*別紙立チトト因シテ

No. 2

昭和十九年七月十七日零時半分東條吾相來御大要左如
内閣方針ニシテ説明アリ

過般内大臣ヨリ注音アリル三案ニシテ御一、御音向モ承リタル
以テ統帥、確立海相、交渉ハ之ヲ斷行スルニ決シ今夜海相候補
野村宣邦太尉ニ面談意見、一致于是ニ至リ

1906.1.6 W(106)

當初、方針未定、際ハ統帥問題考へ居テカリシが大勢上ニ、
考慮セサルベカラリ三至シ結果竟モハ陸海軍、統一不充
分ナ事能ニ惹起スレ候ア。此年ヨリ見テ内閣、改造其他向
題公最小限度止ム、方針ニ変更セリ。

太本營、強化

從來鬼角事務的トナリ活用不充分+連絡會議ノ刷新強
化化シ總理級國務大臣ニ多(阿部米内)考エヲ加ヘ兩總長、兩大臣
軍需外務大臣等ヲ加ヘテ構成、
内閣、改造

航空増強、為大軍需大臣ヲ專任シ前國務大臣ヲ充ツ
従、テ國務大臣トシテ岸久、是江ヲ本、翼政會ヨ、入閣セ
シヒ當厚生大臣前田又八鳩田ヲ起用ス、太本營會議強化、意
味ニテ何部米内兩大臣ニ國務大臣トシテ密ニ交渉ス
重臣關係

重臣側ニ於テ希望アハ參議制、復活ヲ考慮スル用意アリ
今後密傳テ之テ重臣ト常連絡セシム、充分重臣、意向ヲ
反映セシム

翼政會關係

顧問制、技術、政治、兩部門、分子政治顧問五人ヲ置キ、二貴
族兩院議員ヲ配入

以上

1906.1.6

1218

Entry for 18 July 1944 from KIDO's Diary

18 July 1944. (Clear).

Hottest weather of the year. Today's entry is on separate sheets.

At 8 A.M. Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA visited me. Received report on the circumstances of the Senior Statesmen's Conference at HIRANUMA's house.

Mr. Hisatada HIROSE came and talked to me about the pressing situation.

Went to the office at 9 A.M.

Was received in audience from 9:15 to 9:30. Reported to the Throne concerning the trend of the Senior Statesmen, principally about their meeting at HIRANUMA's residence. At 9:30 Premier TOJO proceeded to the Imperial Palace to be received in audience. Saw him and talked with him in the First Anteroom. The Premier revealed to me that he had decided on a resignation en bloc. Accordingly, I said that in order to carry out the political change smoothly, in view of the importance of the Army's position in the domestic picture, I should like to be informed, for my own information, of the succeeding Prime Minister, if he had one in mind. The Premier answered that the Senior Statesmen have a heavy responsibility for the present political change; therefore, he supposed that they must have a plan in mind and he would not venture to give his opinions. However, in case a cabinet headed by an Imperial prince were considered, he hoped that none of the Army royalty would be taken into consideration.

Received in audience from 10:05 A.M. to 10:25. Reported among other things to the Emperor about the Senior Statesmen's Conference, to be held following the resignation en bloc of the cabinet.

Was received in audience from 11:25 to 11:40, and was shown the written resignation of TOJO and the other cabinet members.

TSURUKO was preparing lunch at the official residence so I went there at noon with Chief Secretary, MATSUDAIRA. Mrs. Keiko SOMA came with her daughter Hisako and they had lunch with us.

Went to work at 1:30. In response to a summons from His Majesty, had an audience from 4 to 4:02. His Majesty asked me

if HIRANUMA intended to form a cabinet. I replied that he probably did not.

Then I went at once to the Senior Statesmen's Conference.

The Details of the Senior Statesmen's Conference

Having been summoned by the Emperor former Prime Minister WAKATSUKI, OKADA, HIROTA, KONOYE, HIRANUMA, ABE and YONAI, President of the Privy Council HARA and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO met in conference, at 4 P.M. on 1st July Showa /1944/. Discussion was held as to who should be recommended to the Throne as premier of the succeeding cabinet, Premier TOJO having tendered his resignation. The conference was closed at 8:45 P.

Grand Chamberlain HYAKUTAKE, who attended the meeting in accordance with the Emperor's wish, notified those present of the import of the Imperial summons. Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO gave a detailed explanation of the circumstances which had led to the resignation en bloc of the TOJO Cabinet.

The members then went into a discussion. First of all, Mr. YONAI reported on how he had been asked by the cabinet to join it. His report was as follows:

(1) At about 5:30 A.M. of the 13th Secretary AKAMATSU informed me that the Premier intended to visit me. He, however, did not come, tho I do not know the reason.

(2) On the 17th Finance Minister ISHIWATA called and urged me to join the Cabinet. Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau OKA visited me also and earnestly urged me to join the Cabinet, for the sake of the Navy. But I replied that it was unreasonable, that it might be a different matter if, for the sake of the Navy I returned to active service in the Navy and became a member of the Supreme War Council but I could be of no use by becoming a State Minister. I wrote a note to Mr. OKA saying, "After deep consideration I have decided to reject the proposal," and thus indicated my decision.

(3) A little past 9 P.M. on the 17th, SATO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau called on me. Navy Minister NOMURA was here also. They urged me by turns to join the Cabinet but in the end failed to make me change my mind.

Then the discussion began, the important questions and answers being as follows:

WAKATSUKI: What is your opinion, Mr. KIDO?

KIDO: I have no definite opinion as yet, but would like to hear you all first. Isn't it a good idea to consider the matter along lines of the agreement made at the meeting at BARON HIRANUMA's residence?

HARA: What meeting was that?

WAKATSUKI: The Senior Statesmen met at Baron HIRANUMA's home, out of anxiety over the national situation. No special discussion occurred at the time concerning a new Cabinet.

ABE: Let me express my views to expedite the discussion. As a split between the state affairs and the Supreme Command will be dangerous, it is necessary that they keep in close contact. In short, I think a military man on the active list will be suitable at this time. And as the Navy plays the most important role at the present, isn't it better that a Navy man should take up the premiership? For this reason, what do you say to asking Admiral YONAI to assume the duty?

YONAI: In my opinion, the military man's original duty is to devote himself to the particular field of strategy and command, and it is most proper that the civil officials handle political affairs. It is unwise to appoint now from the Army and now from the Navy, like GENJI and HEIKE.

ABE: That's not my idea.

YONAI: If there is no suitable man among the civil officials, it will be better that an Army man assume the post. I would not be able to hold the position for a month, and judging from my past experience, I feel that I would cause you trouble instead.

WAKATSUKI: For the purpose of discussion I suggest this as a tentative plan. I think a military man is preferable during wartime. At present we must rely upon the Navy as our first line of national defense. Hence, if any Navy man were to be suggested for the premiership I wonder if he wouldn't feel scruples about taking it. Therefore, I think it is better that some one from the Army take the post. A Premier should have political ability. In this sense, I think General UGAKI would be most competent though I do not know the latest conditions. General ABE seemed to have an objection to the idea previously, but--.

ABE: I do not know how General UGAKI is getting along.

YONAI: I understand the fact that the Navy stands at the forefront. After all, the Military should concentrate on warfare. The Military men have naturally received a one-sided education, and I believe that it is for this very reason that they are

strong. And for this reason also they are unsuitable for politics.

WAKATSUKI: Mr. YONAI's view is not without reason, but our country's practice is quite different from that of England and America. Also, our nation is not educated according to the same custom as that of America and Britain. It would be difficult for Japan to reach that point in one jump.

YONAI: Unless it is corrected now, our country will be done for.

KONOYE: If the military authorities themselves do not correct this point, the civilian officials certainly can't do it. It is an idealistic thing. Taking the matter practically ---- /original illegible/ a military person would be better. A military man with such ideas will do. The question of whether he be Army or Navy shall be decided by narrowing down the discussion.

KIDO: In short, it is a practical problem. Our first object is to finish the war. Even if we tried to reform the political system simultaneously it would be impossible to do. To think on two planes at this time will obscure our objective.

HIRANUMA: I quite agree with Prince KONOYE. We are now at the stage where we must think of how to protect our national structure and the security of the Imperial Family. The matter of increased munitions production alone could not be handled by anybody but a military man.

WAKATSUKI: How about making it a military person, not limiting it to a man on the active list?

KONOYE: We had better gradually narrow our process of selection.

YONAI: I have no self-confidence, judging from my past experience as a premier.

WAKATSUKI: That was peacetime.

HARA: To be sure, my official position is such that I do not know how the political situation stands. The present situation is so grave that the next Cabinet will decide the fate of our country. It would be too much to place the full responsibility on a single military man alone. It should be a national cabinet influential and popular people. Accordingly, won't it be a good idea to let about five men cooperate and accept the responsibility. As the Emperor has commanded, "Organize a cabinet in cooperation," this might be all right. The Imperial command will fall upon the five men here and they, choosing the premier from among themselves, will cooperate in administering state

affairs. The situation is such that no one can undertake it.

KIDO: I can well understand what Mr. HARA means. I don't suppose that any one objects so far, but I believe that the practical application would be very difficult.

WAKATSUKI: Just as the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal says, we should indicate one individual in replying, or His Majesty may have trouble.

HIROTA: The situation may become such that a desperate act will become necessary. We must also think of the security of the Imperial Family. The new Cabinet must be the highest and most powerful organization. At this time, should we not have a Prince of the blood at the head of the new Cabinet? I feel that a good number of Army and Navy General Officers should closely assist the Emperor.

Prince KONOYE: A Cabinet of the Imperial Family is not proper at the present stage.

HIRANUWA: I, too, think it is not good, though the time may come when we must consider such a thing.

WAKATSUKI: An Imperial Family cabinet is not good.

OKADA: The next Cabinet should be a strong national cabinet, whether viewed from abroad or from home. It must fight out the war, and it must wage an impossible war. The question is how to make a real national Cabinet.

HAFA: I think so too. One man cannot do it. If one individual is to be recommended, I shall keep silence.

OKADA: The next Cabinet ought not be a cabinet of any one, but should be the Emperor's cabinet.

KIDO: I can well understand what you mean, but practically speaking what do you want to do?

HAFA: The Cabinet should not belong to this man or that.

HIRANUWA: That is the very way I feel, but at any rate we must decide who will occupy first place. At the present stage, it must be some one from the military. It goes without saying that the Cabinet is under direct Imperial rule.

WAKATSUKI: That is right.

OKADA: As far as this point is concerned, I am of the same opinion as YONAI. It might be best if the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal who has a clear idea of the Emperor's wishes and of the home situation were to do it.

HARA: That will do because the Ministers of War and Navy will select both Chiefs of General Staff in the field of military command.

KIDO: Judging from the domestic and foreign situations, and especially the strengthening of home defense, I believe that the next premier should be an army man.

WAKATSUKI: Our answer to the Throne should not be too vague. Mr. HARA's suggestion will need further discussion.

ABE: In plain words then, it has been generally agreed that a military man is preferable. However, a man who is a military man alone is not enough. Judging from the actual conditions in all-out warfare, civil officials and retired military men cannot keep satisfactory contact with military operations. Navy men would be suitable for brightening up our nation.

HIROTA: I think it is necessary at this time to form a real national Cabinet, with a member of the Imperial Family in the central post.

WAKATSUKI: It is not good to impose political responsibility upon the Imperial Family.

KIDO: That is right.

HIRANUMA: At this stage it's still not right.

Knows The same

KIDO: The strengthening of home defense, the increase of Army strength in the homeland and that of the military police require that we choose some one from the Army.

ABE: That will not renew the people's morale.

WAKATSUKI: An army man seems better.

YONAI: Though I recommended a civilian at first, I think that an Army man is best after all, having heard the explanation of the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal. I wish to take back my previous opinion on this point.

ABE: The Army is unpopular. The nation's trust in the Navy is apparent.

HIRANUMA: At present there are two viewpoints prevalent among the people, and the Army is on the unpopular side.

HIROTA: Does the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal mean martial law by his previous explanation?

KIDO: No, I do not mean that. I mean the stationing of army forces all over the country.

YONAI: How about Marshal TERAUCHI?

ABE: There is reason to think it would be difficult in practice.

HIRANUMA: It is not good, to delay the formation of the Cabinet at this time.

KONOYE: Why did the TOJO Cabinet fall? -- Because it had declined in public favor. Therefore, the Army must change its attitude in order to renew popular confidence.

HIRANUMA: The desire in all quarters is that the Army stop interfering with them.

KONOYE: There have been leftist thoughts among some men in the army for more than ten years. Today there is an attempt to carry out a left-wing revolution through the cooeration of the Military, the officials, and the people. This is more dangerous than defeat itself, and I fear a left-wing revolution more than defeat, for even if defeated, we can maintain the Imperial Family and the national structure, but in case of a leftist revolution we cannot do so. From this viewpoint the selection of the War Minister is most important.

YONAI: Judging from that point, an army man is better.

WAKATSUKI: I've entertained doubts on that point for some time.

HIRANUMA: So have I.

KONOYE: Can TERAUCHI control that?

ABE: He is a straightforward man, but in the first place to call him back from the front would be difficult.

ABE: The next premier must be some one popular among the Army.

WAKATSUKI: Isn't UGAKI popular among the Army?

ABE: I do not know how popular he has been recently.

YONAI: Mr. ABE, isn't there anyone who is popular?

ABE: UMEZU is a man of character. There are a few others but they are all at the front and it will be difficult to call them back.

HIRANUMA: UMEZU is out of the question. Isn't there any other Navy man?

YONAI: In view of what the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal has said, it might be better to chose someone from the Army.

HIRANUMA: Considerable experience would be needed to suppress the leftism referred to by Prince KONOYE.

KONOYE: There are some people who recommend Mr. Kentaro SUZUKI.

YONAI: We had better not recommend him.

HIRANUMA: Putting aside individual reasons, I think it proper that he take the post for the sake of the state. I know him very well and think he is an honorable man.

YONAI: I said that from the standpoint of the nation's interest.

HIROTA: He seems to be a moderate person.

HIRANUMA: Tho he is strong he is a man who can accept other people's opinions.

HIRANUMA: I know him very well, too, after working together with him in the Privy Council. Mr. SUZUKI has always said he will never take a political seat as he is a soldier. He has even said that even if commanded by His Majesty /T.N. to form a cabinet/ he would never accept it. I'm telling you this for reference.

OKADA: As a man he is a fine person, but when I think of the soldiers at the front, I think an Army man is better.

HIROTA: I feel that we are in an important stage where we must reform the basis of the Japanese system. Everybody should be present at Imperial Headquarters.

HIRANUMA: In practice, this is impossible.

HIROTA: As the prosecution of the war is first and foremost, as long as the four pillars of the Army and the Navy are firm, that is enough.

KIDO: A man like Marshal TERAUCHI is one of them too.

WAKATSUKI: Now that we are conferring, the people may feel uneasy unless the Imperial Command to form a cabinet is issued in a day or two. Therefore I think we had better choose either UGAKI or General UMEZU.

KIDO: How about Marshal HATA?

KONOYE: As I have stated before, if an army man is to be recommended, it is a necessary condition that he make a change in the Army so as to renew the public confidence and that he suppress the leftist element. If UMEZU can do this, he may be all right.

HIRANUMA: Political experience is necessary.

KIDO: What is the comment at the front about Mr. UGAKI? As there is the enemy's propaganda offensive to be feared, it is no good if Mr. UGAKI's appointment causes discontent and unrest among the soldiers at the front.

ABE: Is the idea of a Navy man in the minority?

ABE: If an army man is preferred, the next question is who?

KIDO: If circumstances permit, how about TERAUCHI or HATA?

ABE: The order may be (1) TERAUCHI, (2) UMEZU, and (3) HATA.

KIDO: As to UMEZU, the fact that he has only recently been appointed Chief of the Army General Staff and that he has had no ministerial career should be considered.

HIRANUMA: The next is YONAI, a Navy man.

KONOYE: There is also Mr. Kantaro SUZUKI.

KONOYE: And what about the question of Mr. UGAKI?

HIRANUMA: I don't know about him lately.

KIDO: What other army generals are there besides these?

ABE: Well, there are HONJO, ARAKI, KOISO, and then there's TOJO.

KIDO: How about KOISO?

YONAI: KOISO is a good man, capable and courageous.

KONOYE: Isn't he a man of UGAKI's type but of smaller calibre?

ABE: Absolutely different.

KIDO: How does he get along with Army men of the active list?

ABE: Not so badly, I believe. He is a different sort of man from TOJO.

FIRANUMA: He is a high calibre man and a pious one.

KIDO: What are his ideas?

WAKATSUKI: I have no objection, although I don't know him.

OKADA: KONOYE: We don't know him too well. What are the opinions of Mr. YONAI and Mr. FIRANUMA? He was a member of each of your cabinets.

FIROTA: No objection.

ABE: No objection.

OKADA: Now we must reexamine the question of whether KOISO can organize a truly national Cabinet. This is an extremely important time and, as we need not come to a final decision in one or two hours, I want to study the matter fully.

KIDO: I have in mind a plan to request the Emperor to call a conference of Senior Statesmen and Ministers in the Imperial Palace like the conferences of Elder Statesmen and Ministers of past years. I am now studying that matter.

OKADA: The formation of a cabinet requires careful thought.

FIROTA: How about a cabinet by direct Imperial order /CHOKUMEI NAIKAKU/ or a coalition cabinet of Army and Navy?

WAKATSUKI: Actually there is a vice-premier in every cabinet.

KIDO: I must submit to the Throne Mr. HARA's opinion in detail.

KIDO: What is the order of the candidates?

WAKATSUKI: TERAUCHI, HATA, KOISO, and a naval man.

FIRANUMA: TERAUCHI, KOISO, HATA, and a naval man.

YONAI: TERAUCHI, KOISO, HATA. By the way when I recommended KOISO as a cabinet member before, the Emperor asked for the reason.

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HIRANUMA: Speaking of KOISO I was asked by the Emperor about his connection with the UGAKI affair.

KONOYE: I don't know any of the three.

MIROTA: TERAUCHI, KOISO, YAMA.

ABE: TERAUCHI, KOISO, YAMA.

OKADA: I don't know any of the three.

KIDO: I would like to have a meeting of the Senior Statesmen and the Imperial nominee in order that the former may support the latter.

WAKATSUKI: If they were to hamper the nominee, of course it would be very bad, but if the nominee himself wishes it, we will meet with pleasure.

KIDO: Thank you for taking part in this long discussion. I will submit your opinions in detail to the Throne.

- - -

The meeting being closed, I was immediately received in audience by the Emperor in his study from 8:50 to 9:15. I reported the results of the conference in detail. I asked the Emperor to inquire of the Army High Command whether the appointment of Field-Marshal TERAUCHI, the first candidate, would affect the military operations as he is the Supreme Commander of the Southern Area Army. The Emperor replied that he would have the Chief Aide-de-Camp ask the Chief of the General Staff TOJO (who happened to be at the palace for the installation ceremony for new Chief of the General Staff UMEZU). At 9:50 p.m., I was received in audience again. His Majesty told me as follows:

Upon the Emperor's asking Chief of the General Staff TOJO as to the effect upon the military operations of Field-Marshal TERAUCHI's appointment, the latter opposed the idea for the following two reasons. The Emperor thought them reasonable and has decided to appoint General KOISO.

1) When the enemy's counter-offensive is at its height, it is impossible to leave the post of front line Supreme Commander vacant even for a single day.

2) To allow the domestic political situation to affect the front lines is bad for morale, and is certain to cause serious repercussions in the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

as well as among neutral powers. Therefore, such a step must be avoided by all means.

After asking the Emperor to summon the Grand Chamberlain and to order him to make arrangements for summoning General KOISO, I withdrew.

I was summoned and was received in audience from 10:10 to 10:25 p.m. The Emperor revealed to me his impression that judging from the line-up at the installation ceremony, TOJO might resume the post of War Minister after all and asked me if I didn't think so. I replied that I feared that it would have an unfavorable effect on the political situation.

It was past eleven when I returned home and at last had dinner.

* * *

木戸侯日記三月、抜萃

昭和十九年七月十八日(晴)

暑氣乍乍ナリ長日、記事六則、残ニアリ

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別裁

昭和十九年七月十八日

午前八時松平被書官長末郎平沼即ニ於ケル重臣、會同、
情況等、報告ヲ受ク

廣瀬久忠氏來仰聚、迫セリ情況、ツキ詰アリタリ
午前九時出仕

午時十五分ヨリ同三十分迄梓謁平沼即ニ於ケル重臣、會同、
中心ニ重臣、動向ニツキ言上ス

九時半至る條、首相梓謁為ニ參内第一休所ニ於ケル讀入
首相ハ總辭職ヲ決意、旨内意漏サル依ツテ余ハ陸軍、
國內体勢ニ有る重要性ニ鑑ニ、内滿ニ改妻ヲ推移セシム為
自外、合之迄ニ後、繼首相ニツキ御考アレバ承リ置キ度レト
尋ネタルニ首相ハ、今回、改妻ニ重臣、責任力重レト考フ
從ツテ重臣六、既ニ腹あ不ガオアリ、コト、思フ故、敢々自今意
見ハ述べズ、只皇族内閣等考慮セラル、場合ニハ、陸軍、皇族
ヲ不考ヘトモ様、願度シ云々ト答ヘテタリ

No 1

8/12/78

午前十時五分ヨリ同二十五分迄梓謁内閣總辭職、伴、重臣
會議開催、其他ニツキ言上ス
十一時半ヨリ同四十分迄梓謁東條首相以下、辞表ヲ
拜見ス

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乙午鶴子官舎ニテ晝食、住友ヲナレ居ルヲ以テ松平官長ヲ
伴シ赴ク相馬慶子サン久子全實ヲ伴シ晝食五ノ入
一時半出仕

四時ヨリ四時二刻迄即召ニヨリ群謁、平沼ニ於テ詔閣意を
アルニアラスマトノ印亭ネアリ恐ラク甚矣ハ十カルベキ旨奏答入
直ニ重臣會議、席ニ赴ク

重臣會議顛末

昭和十九年七月十八日午後四時ヨリ即召ミリ參集せん若槻
固田、廣田、近衛、平沼、阿部米内、前首相原柜相
及木戸内大臣會合、左條内閣總理大臣諒表降呈セシワキ
後繼内閣首班、奏請ニウト協議シ午後八時半玉が散會入
百武侍従長旨ヲ奉シテ出席即召、趣旨ヲ一同ニ傳フ
木戸内大臣ヨリ左條内閣、總辞職アヌニ至リタル事情ヲ詳
細説明ス

次第各員、協議ニアリタルガ先ツ最初ニ米内氏ヨリ内閣ヨリ
入闈、文書ヲ受ケタル經緯ニツキ報告アリタリ即チ
一十九年六月五時半頃赤松神官ヨリ首相訪問ニ連
絡アリタルモ遂ニ如何ナル事情ナリシカ未訪ハナカリキ

一十七日在波藏相末訪入闈ア勘メアル國軍務局長ニ未訪
海軍、為メ是非入闘ヲ極力勧メシカ右ハ筋違ニテ海
軍、為メナレバ現役ニ復帰軍事參議官等ニ就任シバ
不智アズ國務大臣トアリテモ何、役ニモ立タズト合ヘ「熟慮
」結果辭退スルコトニ決意ス上書レヨ與ヘ自己ノ決意明ニセリ
一十七年廿九時四佐藤軍務局長未訪野村海軍大臣モ邀ヒ

No.2

Doc 1632W(13)

ニ來ラレ交々勧メ乞タルが遂ニ余ノ決意ヲ辭スニ至リヤ
一次イニ勧議ニ主ル向答左、如レ

一若櫻、内府、中臺向ハ如何

一不戸木夕確定的ナル意見ヲ有セス、先ツ而意向ヲ承リ度レ
平沼男郎ニ於ケル而會合、際、申合セ、趣旨ニテ方處モハ
可ナリヤルカ

一原其、會合トハ何

一若櫻不熊ノ憂慮、餘り重吾、平沼男郎ニ集リシニテ
後継内閣等ニツイテ別段ノ語ハナカリキ

一阿部一向題、進行上未席ヨリ意見ヲ述ブ、國格ト統帥
ノ間ニ隙ガ生ジテハ大要故是非密接ニ持ツテ行クユトク必需要、
端的ニ云ヘ此際ハ軍人ニシテ現役者ノミント思フ、而ニ現下最
元大事ニ所ハ海軍ナレバ此際海軍ヨリ出テレテハ如何

就テハ此際米内閣下ニ而願ヒシテハ如何

一米内自今ハ軍人ト云フモノハ作戦統帥ノカラニアリテ專念之ニ
從フ事旨トスト考ヘ居リ政治ハ文官、當ニカ至當ナリ

今度ハ陸軍次ハ海軍ト源平、如ナルハ宜シカラス

一阿部ノノ考ヘニアラス

一米内文官ニ適任者ガナケレバ陸軍カラ出ラルガ宜シカラシ自
今テハ一ヶ月持テ、スト思フ、嘗テ、自今、經驗カラ見テ却ソテ申
迷惑ヲカケルコト、思フ

一若櫻向題ヲ出ス意味ニテ試、案トヨムフ、戰争中ハ矢張實

ガ宜シト思フ、此際國防、オ一線ハ海軍ニ賴ム外ナレ之ニ海軍
カラ首相カラ出ラレルト却ソテ御氣兼申遠慮ガアリハシナカト思フ

No.3

Doc / 632W(1/3)

No.4

從了都了陸軍了出行心方宣心了上思了。首相タ心以上八改治的
年晚了有七八八九月。此意味一了最近事情八自命八知了。方
宇宣太將了總往了上思了。美國八門部下二向是論了。
様。思了。

一阿部宇宣太將，近情了。

一米内海軍才一謀立了上思了。判心、軍八要入作戰事
念入八十七年十一元末軍人八底輸，故有八宣宇底心了。多
力了ソ又強八ト信了。底比従了。改治八不向了上思了。

一若視米内閣下，即說「一應印丸九刀英采，如智價了上思了。
上六達了國民。其六養旅セラス。日你了。一證」二行々八
困難了上思了。

一米内今直サレハ國八滅了。

一近衛軍自了此矣了道了了了。文宣がヤヒ八無理了。
乙八理想論了。現實問題(以下不列)

軍人八宣心了。了考了持ツク軍人八宣心。陸海軍何乃。
江了然了行ツク了決了了了。

一本戶要入現定問題了。我半完遂了才目的了。
同明：政治、律體、巡査了。上思了。實行八可能大心。
此深一面的考了八目的。晦迷了。公化廣了。

一平沼近衛公上全了同意心了。國体、擁護皇室、尊奉
這於心八カノハ設階了。軍需增產、兵士見了。軍人
了了六切了六半力ソカノ上思了。

一若視現役限八軍人了。上思了。如何

一近衛公上近衛方針？旅々行者八宣心了。

一、内閣、自分、首相、上手、経験、うまい自信+し
一、若槻、ソノ八年情+ト

一、原、宗八、自分、位便、政治情勢、判+ト不竹+ト、財局、極
意大ニシテ此、内閣ニヨリ國、運命、ガキマルト云フ所+ト、軍人、
三全責任、負ト云フハ無理、自+ト威望、下人、舉國一致
内閣久化要ス、就テハ五人位協同、シテ印、引受、久化トニテハ
如何、御事協力、シテ内閣、組織、上仰セテ不可+ト
比慶、席、五人、付、大命、下、組立、首相、總、協同致
シテモ國難ニ當ル此、能勢（以下不明）

二、引受ケテハ時勢ニアラス上思フ

一、不戸原サ、印氣持ハ良ク利也此、失徳ヲ、誰セ申思也
一、个ト思フ、其實行方法、頗ル難シト思フ

一、若槻、内大臣、云ハシ一通、ハチ六張、奉送、シテハ誰々ト云フ
個人ニセサヘ、御園、三十人、テ八十人

一、廣田、捨身、紫ラナス事態、方宣タルヤモハカラレバ、皇室、御安
泰ヲ考ヘサヘカラズ、最高最難、且減、ナサルヘカラズ此際、皇
族ヲ中心ニ載、シト、此事ハ十キカ、陛下、左右、陸海軍將
官が沢山附隨セルトガ必要ナリト思フ

一、近衛公、現段階、三、八、皇族内閣、不可+ト

一、平沼、自分、現段階、三、不可+ト思フ、ソウ云コトヲ考ヘ本ハナ
ラス時、ガ来。カセ知シナイカ

一、若槻、皇族内閣、イナナ

一、岡田、今度、内閣、外國、ヨリ是テ、又國内、ヨリ見テ、強力、舉國一
致、内閣ナガルベカラズ、戰、役、ハナラヌ、管理、軍事、テ、シ
ナラヌ如何、スレバ、其、舉國一致内閣、出来得セヤ

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No. 6

一 原、自命は「考へて今事態は個人より二十人余りの内閣に及ぶ」
一 國田、今度出来内閣へは、内閣大臣十人陛下、内閣
ササヒベカラス

一 木戸、氣持ヨリ判比方實際ドウヨウト云ひ、力
一 原、誰々、内閣ト云フト云イナシナ
一 平沼、氣持ヨリ、内閣大臣何ニテ首班三立ノ人ヲ決メサセカラズ
一 金井、陸軍省三元、軍部出身十三サセカラズ御禁政アリコト勿論ト
國田、其後大日本米内同様ニ思フ陛下、聖慮ヲ判リ、國內情
勢之方に判居ル内大臣がヤルヒハ一番サセカラシ
一 原、巡師、陸海軍大臣、總長ヲ選フ故ソレモヨリ
一 木戸、内外情勢殊、今後國內、防衛能勢ヲ強化シ、兵事
陸軍口人十三サセカラズト信ム
一 若槻、餘バトシ奉答テ、ナシナリ、原テ、又協議スコト
トナシ
一 阿部、サツクバラン云フ軍人ヨカラシト、太体決マシ、而、軍人ヨ軍
人夫アリ有、總力戰、實情ヨリ見テ文官ヤ豫備軍人アハ作
戰、連絡、不允合ナシ思フ、國民、明朗トシム爲海軍が宜シ
カシ
一 廣田、此際中心、皇族、載、兵、舉國一致、内閣ヲ作ル事アリ
ト思考ス
一 若槻、皇族、政治上、責任ヲ負フトナシ不可丁
一 木戸、然
一 平沼、現段階アリ未少不可ナリ
一 近衛
一 木戸、國土防衛体制、強化、陸軍、内地、於ル配備増強、憲

No. 9

Doc. 1632 W(113)

兵強化等より見て此際陸軍より出でたり外ナント考ア
阿部ソシテハ人氣一新ニテラス

若櫻陸軍が宜シカアシ

米内今迄大臣、説明ヲ聽イア一應之文宣ト云フ説ア
出生ノガ天張、陸軍カラ出でしハ宜シト云ア此点前説ア
取消ス

阿部陸軍ハ人氣ナリ海軍ハ國民之興望ハ想ひア居ル
平沼現在國民見方ニツアリ陸軍方評判悪シ
廣田内所、免程、説明公威嚴令ア意味セラルヤ

(次頁へ譲ア)

no 8

米內若櫻平治近畿阿部

木戶内米阿都平浪近

近衛

Dol 1632 N(113)

否其意ハアラズ只國內津々浦々迄陸軍
配備セラルトシテ之ノ意未タリ
寺内元帥ハ如何
比現困難卜思ハルヒ節アリ
此際組閣長ヨコトハ千千十
東條内閣何故倒シテガ陸軍不許
ヲ買人心離反シタル爲ナリ從ナテ人心ヲ
一新スル爲ハ陸軍ハ從来、熊谷ヲ變へル
クトカ心寧ナリ
各方面、希望之軍力各方面=千萬スルコトヲ
亮止スルコトナリ
十数年來陸軍内一部=左翼思想アリ
今日軍官民=一連結クト左翼革命
企テントスル也、アリ此失敗軍以ニ危険ニ
テ自分ハ敗戦ヨリモ左翼革命ヲ恐心ル也、三ツ
敗戦ハ自己宗國体ヲ維持シ得ルも革命ハ然ル
ガハク以ナリ此失敗ヨリ見テ陸軍大臣は邊
重太ナリ
其失敗ハ陸軍ヨリ逃げや
其失敗ハ從来ヨリ経て居タル事ナリ
全體同感ナリ
寺内ハ其失敗ハ得ルヤ
寺内ハ直情徑行ナガキノ一派ヨリ板ヨコト
ニ困難ベシ

169

國田

米内
平沼

近衛
米内
平沼

平沼
米内

阿部
若槻
阿部
米内
阿部

DOC1632W(1/3)

軍、艦船アヒル十萬艘ヘアズ
宇五二八軍艦海空十キヤ
近況ヲ知ア
阿部サン誰カ艦船ヲ有ヘビ、八十キヤ
梅津等人物十其地三アヒル皆尚的跡
居裏現因體十
梅津氏向題出未ズ 海軍ニ一人八十キヤ
先經内府、六ハシタヒトヨリ見レバ陸軍カラス
方宣シカラン
近衛公、云ハシた僕ヲ押ニコトハ余經経験ヲ
尊スベシ
世間、金木貫太郎氏云々セアリ
之ハオヤリ二十又方ガ宣シカラン
個人、事情ハ忘モ角今日國家、爲ナシハ出ラ
ハシ至當十ラン自分ハヨク知シが立派十人上思
イヤ國が、爲ヨリ見テ而カ云フナリ
德性十人上思
強イヨロセアリ人、言ヲ容レヒ人十
身命を枢府ヲ一循ニ付フ爲ニ度ヨリ知シルが
金木氏常ニ自分ハ軍人十ハ政治的位置ハ
絶対ニ就カズ後今大命アリ上天絶対ニ群衆
セズトナヘカリ高弟秀逸連人ア
人上シテハ立派ナルが前條、將兵等コトヲ考ヘ
ヒトギ陸軍方ガヨロシ上思

26/10

庄田
平沼
大田
木戸
若穂
木戸
近衛
平沼
木戸
阿部
木戸
阿部
木戸
平沼
近衛

DOO/632 W(113)

日本制令、根本ヲ改ムシテ行カニバナラ又様ナ裏大
段階ト思フ總干ハ大本營ニ列スルト云フニト=
セサルベカラズ
ニシハヨリ實ニ出来ヌコトナリ
輪軍事官十人バ陸海軍四本柱ガニカリスレバヨシ
寺内之帥等モ一人ナリ
今日吾々が發=会合シ大命が一兩日下さル時ハ
人心不安ヲ起ス故=宇垣梅津大將が宜シケン
畑元帥ハ如何
陸軍ヨリ出ルトスレバ先程申シタ様ニ心ニ新充
爲不明面目ヲ改ムに不明頃(不明)要條件ナリ
元々出来ルハ梅津ニテセヨ
政治、経験又コトが必要ナリ
宇垣氏ニ計シ前線ヨリ、批判如何=思ハセバ
敵側宣傳攻勢モアリ前線不満運動機ヲ煽フ
ヒヨウデハ困ル
海軍案ハ小数ナリ
大作ニ於テ陸軍案上スレバ人問題ナリ
情況が許スルハ寺内或ハ畑カ
一寺内ニ梅津ニ畑ト云フ順序力
梅津ニウイテハ總長ヲ拜命シテ許ルト、大臣、
経歴ヲ有セサルコト等が問題ナリ
代、次ハ海軍米内
金木貢太郎氏

DOL 1632 W (11.3)

卷之三

是故之謂能知人而獨無以知我者乎

二八

原稿 - 未註明 - 未註明

111. 10

候補會，總事八事會

卷之四

新編增補古今圖書集成

卷之三

詩曰：「綠竹含青，以示我心。」

11. 20° *Sedum pulchellum*

11. 28th 1938 - 1000 hrs.

146

小錢的《小窗》、《小窗》、《小窗》

六

三人一票制

三六四

前胸 胸部

四百三

卷之三

卷之三

金門：中華人民共和國

Wetland - Sedge swamp

1012

Doc 1632 W (11/3)

老様

官相候補引御ナカスに構子リテ即シア西白カニス本人モ希望
入仕ラバ故ノア会見スヘシ

本戸 長時内、附協議、謝ノ函意見アリ久松口口、奉書奉上スミ
會議終了後、直三郎之諭ニ於キ、時正令ヨリ九時十五分迄拜
謁、臣臣會議、模様ヲ奉書奉上シ當第一候補タバ寺内元帥、南
方軍總司令官ナシ改ニテ起用於作戰二天陣、ササ呑ヤシテ統帥
部隊、所下向、下士官等言士人、愴々悔澤、新參謀總長親
補式舉行、爲、參內省事、東條、誅、長官官長ヲ率等
承ヒ化王トシテシテ、改設アリ。

午後九時、五十分儀色ヨリ拜謁左、如年既諱、拜文

寺内元帥、西宮ヨリ作戰一、獨特、東條修長等不見、總長公左
二点三テ及、御セ、尤モコト思、故小松大將、空スコトニス
一反攻、實烈ナシ際第一線、總司令官、一日二日下心コトハ不可解
内地、政治狀勢ヲ前鋒、對應シムハ、氣、獨ニ面白カニス
又東亞共宗國、勿論其、也、中立國等、興ル影響モ甚大
ナハ極力避ケン。

体テ侍従長ナニ世アリ、小磯大將、空、續テ取様、既下命
相成度旨ヲ言ニ退下ス

十時十分ヨリ十時十五分迄、西宮ヨリ拜謁不、今親補式舉行
、除願振、是ヒ陸相ハ結局東條が居振、ト云フ、事皆下トハカニ
思、如何ト、感想相、偏アリ、余トシハ政治狀勢ヨリ見ヒテハ
却ヒテ面白カニス、ハコトナシ、唐突アリ、目ア申シ
斯、テ十一時過帰宅、漸ノシ食ヲ喫ス

11/6. 13

1379

"Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 19 July 1944"

19 July, Wednesday. Fine.

At 2:30 A.M. Mr. SUZUKI, Teichi, at 8 Mr. ABE, Genki, and at 8:30 Mr. HIROSE visited me and each discussed the political situation.

At 10 the Chief Aide-de-Camp came to my office and consulted me about the Imperial message to the Commander of the Kwantung Army.

From 10:20 to 11:35 I was received in audience by His Majesty and reported on the political situation and on other matters.

At 1:00 Mr. KAYA visited me at my office and talked to me about the monetary policy towards China.

At 2 the Chief Aide-de-Camp came to my office and conferred with me regarding the Imperial message to Chief of Army General Staff TOJO.

At 3 Imperial Household Minister MATSUDAIRA came to my office and told me about the circumstances of the change of government.

At 4 Director of the Police Bureau MACHIMURA came to my office and informed me of the conditions of peace and order, etc.

At 6 Prince KONOYE called on me at my home and asked me what I thought about making the next cabinet a coalition cabinet of KOISO and YONAI for the purpose of forming a true national unity cabinet, adding that Baron HIRANUMA had also agreed. As I had been feeling the need of taking some steps to put up a united front, I agreed to the idea, and at 6:30 called in Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA and asked him to find out the views of other elder statesmen before tomorrow morning.

INOUE, Goro came and stayed for the night.

Doc / 632W(114)

Ex 1279

木戸候日記 11月 晴

午前六時半 鈴木貞氏 八時 安倍源基氏 八時半 廣瀬氏
 来訪 何事改情等 了り
 十時 武官長来室 聞軍司令官ハ 勅語ニ協議事
 十时半 小ヨリ 一時三十五分 連絡改情等 ナ言上
 一時 賀屋氏来廠友賃帶改案ニナ話アリ
 二時 武官長来室 事條與長三村入ル 勅語ニ協議事
 三時 松平官相来室 改事情ニ語ル
 四時 斎藤義保局長来室 治安狀況等ヲ聽ク
 六時 近衛公未郎次期内閣ニ眞・舉國一致内閣多ニ
 為メ小磯派内閣立内閣上シテ、如何ト諸アリ。平沼博士
 賛成アリ、コトナリ。余モ亦舉國能勢ヲ整アム為メ何等
 ハ、午、打ツ少事ノ威威アリ故賛成シ。六時半 松平官
 長、招キ他、重臣、意向ヲ今般中二聽取志願頼ス
 #上五郎左來泊

RETRIEVED
TO ROOM 300

"ENTRY FROM MARQUIS KIDO'S DIARY, 20 July 1944"

20 July, Thursday. Cloudy and fine.

At 8 a.m. Mr. HIROSE, and at 8:30 Mr. FUJIYAMA, Aichiro called on me and gave me information.

Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA called on me at 9 and reported the views of each senior statesman. General ABE telephoned me that he could not agree.

From 10:55 to 11:23 I was received in audience by the Emperor and reported in detail the plan for the coalition with YONAI whereupon the plan was accepted. Came home at noon. Accompanied MIKO and CHIKAYOSHI to Tokyo Station on my way to the Palace. Was received in audience from 2:55 to 3:20.

Conference of Senior Statesmen reconvened at 4, and I fully explained the development regarding the coalition. General ABE also revoked his disapproval.

At 4:15 Governor-General KOISO arrived from Korea and immediately came to the Palace. I explained in detail the political situation leading to the resignation en bloc.

I was received in audience from 4:50 to 4:58 and reported to the Throne until I asked his Majesty to summon KOISO and YONAI.

General KOISO and Admiral YONAI were received in audience at the Imperial Study at 5:10. His Majesty gave his message, "Subjects, form a cabinet in cooperation", telling them to observe the text of the Constitution, and to handle the affairs so as not to irritate the Soviet in order that the Greater East Asia War might be accomplished.

As it was also General KOISO's wish, at 5:30 I took the General and the Admiral to a place where the senior statesmen were meeting and brought them together.

I was received in audience from 5:50 to 6:05. Prince KONOYE came to my office at 6:10 and we had a talk. At 7:30 General KOISO called on me at my home and told me about his discussion with Premier TOJO and Chief of Army General Staff UMIZU.

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 4 April 1945

4 April Wednesday Rain

Alarm at 12:50 A.M. Air-raid from 1 to 4:30
The use of a rather large number of time bombs was the
characteristic of this raid.

Went to the OUNDO /P.M. Literally "Imperial
Library" but it actually means underground room
built for air-raid shelter / at 1:10 to attend to my
work. Came home at 5.

I was received in audience in the Imperial Library
from 10:55 to 11:25, and was told by His Majesty of
what he told Koiso in regard to the MIU-Pin matter.
I cannot understand the Premier's attitude, his lack
of confidence in himself.

Visited the Chief-Aide-de-Camp in his room and
told him of my intention in case of a political chance
to meet with the two Chiefs of Staff as well as with
the two Ministers / T.N. Mar and Kavy/ and asked him to
exert his good offices for it.

At 2 o'clock, Premier KOISO came to the office
and talked as per the separate sheet.

At 2:30, NAKAMURA, Governor of NIIGATA Prefecture
came to the office for a talk.

I was received in audience in the Imperial Library
from 3:45 to 3:05, and reported to the Prime Minister
KOISO's intention to resign from office.

Visited the Grand Chamberlain at 3:15 to discuss
with him the question of the mass resignation of the
cabinet.

At 3:30, Foreign Minister SHIGEMIJI came to my
room and informed me of the details of his talk with
the Premier regarding the MIU matter.

Came home at 5. KOISO left for TOKYO.

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

/T.N. - Separate Sheet/

4 April 1945

At 2 P.M. Premier KOISO came to the office and talked to the following effect.

"As I have previously discussed with you, I am of the opinion that, in the war situation of today the present organization and character of the government as the highest national organ are by no means, good. That is why, with the Emperor's permission, I was admitted to Imperial Headquarters. I have also given my opinion /r.h. there/ concerning the direction of the war but to little avail. From now on, we must have, at any cost, an Imperial Headquarters Cabinet or cabinet which will direct the war. Toward the end of last month, therefore, I talked with YONAI and we discussed the matter from various standpoints. We could think of a reform, but whether we should have it or not was a matter of doubt as we have never known of a cabinet being strengthened by reform. In fact, I informed His Majesty of this question at the end of last month. I had also thought at that time of opening the second Greater East Asia Conference in the middle of the month. Also in view of the war situation in OKINAWA, I had been thinking of deciding on my step at about the end of the month. However, not only has the second Greater East Asia Conference come to be suspended (a meeting of Ambassadors is now under consideration in its place) but also it is likely that the war in OKINAWA may take several months more. Meanwhile it happens that in the Army Marshal SUGIYAMA and Marshal HAGA have been decided upon to go out as Commanders-in-Chief in order to strengthen the defense structure. Accordingly, the Army is going to recommend General AMANI to the Throne as War Minister and I hear that the Army wants to realize the above plan by about the 6th. Such being the case, it would not be faire to recognize this change now and then carryout the mass resignation at the end of the month." Therefore, upon consultation with Navy Minister YONAI today, a resignation en bloc is desired for the reasons given in the separate sheet.

Then I asked KOISO when he proposed to do this. He answered that if it suited the Emperor, he was thinking of having a special cabinet meeting today to gather the letters of resignation, but I suggested that he had better do so tomorrow morning as there would be no time for His Majesty to consider the question if it happened too suddenly. KOISO agreed with me.

Was received in audience at 2:45 and reported the matter to the Emperor. I stated that this time the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal would like to see the Marshal of the Army and Navy and the two Chiefs of Staff prior to the Senator Statesman's Conference, and received the Emperor's permission.

/P.M. Text of Heise's reasons for resigning/

Since we are convinced that at this moment when the situation of the Empire is getting more and more urgent, with changes on both political and war fronts east and west, and when there should exist no disorientation between the battlefield and the home front or between the Supreme Command and the Civil Government a fundamental change should be made in the organization and character of the cabinet so that they may cope with the present situation and so that the cabinet, together with the whole nation with resounding resolution may be powerful enough to go straight forward for the accomplishment of the great task of assisting the Throne. To this end we have decided to ask permission of the Emperor to tender our resignation and carry out a resignation as well.

Dec/632W(11)

戸口五時五分迄御朝小機首相ニ仰ニシ可然言上ス
退去ガテ藤田侍従長ニ右、事情ヲ説明ス
午後汗出ニ心事部和子兩人ノ方歸リ來リ食ヲ其ニ
参考部和子ハ八時過運立于ニ歸途ニ就
舎子ハ十二時半後汽車ニテ塩山ニ歸ル

四月四日 昭和二十年四月四日

午前十三時半警報一時ヨリ四時半迄空襲アリ今向
一時限爆弾相当多數用ヒテシタルカ特長ト
一時十分御文庫三出仕五時歸宅ス
十時二十五分ヨリ十一時二十九分迄御文庫ニテ拜謁
相談件ニツキ小機首相ニ御詰、模様ヲ承ル首
相確信キ能済不可解ナリ
一時四十分武官長居室ニ訪ニ第一政務大臣、
賀場合而總長兩大臣ニ面談、意向ヲ傳ヘ幹旋ノ役
賴ス

Ex 12A/1
1/6/1

二時小機首相来室引紙、如キ話アリ
二時半田村新潟縣知事来室面談
二時四十分ヨリ三時五分迄御文庫ニテ拜謁小機首
相、許意ヲ言上ス
三時十五分侍従長ヲ訪ニ内閣總辭職、件ニテ
連絡ス
三時半事務官外相来室參、件ニテ自相
カク總辭職ニキ話アリ
九時歸山大信男福富山ニテ見ス

No 2

豫豫于御相談を致せし二十日が戰局今日、狀況二於、國家最高機關トニテ政府、組織性格ハドウシテ天
之盡テハイケナリ思フヨコテ御許ヲ得テ大本營
ニ到ニシト二月十九日軍事指導ニシテ自今モ意見ヲ云
アテニシカガトニ元老分子行ハタレトウカシモ之カズハ
大本營當内閣戰爭指導内閣ニシバイケレバイケナリコテ
先月、赤須米内上毛詰テ放送云フコトモ考ヘラル
力改造ニテ強化サシタ試カナカラ之モ考ヘモダト
種々詔令シ申候、先月末ニ陛下ニモ御詔申上次
第十一室時、第二回大臣會議中旬ニ開催
スル云フ考ヘモアリ沖繩、戰況等ニ鑑、月未位
ニハ進退ヲ來シタシト考ヘテ居、トコロ第二
回大臣會議中立スコトナリ之二代ル大臣會議
ノ目下調査申タル、ニニス沖繩、戰況ニ數月ヲ
要ニヤ知ズ偶、陸軍ニ於テ防衛態勢強化、
爲メ松山烟西元帥カ總司令官ニテセルコトナリ
従フ、阿南大將ヲ陸相ニ奏請スルトコトアリ
古日、実現シタリト、コトアリタソウスルト今
此、文達ヲ認ミテシカニテ月末ニ總辭職スルハ如何
モ裏切、様形トナリ、アリ日米内海相トモ相
談、上別紙、様理由ニシテ總辭職シタリトノト
ナリ

doc/1632W(17)

引
四

午後三時小機音相來室在、セキ詰マリ
豫豫于御相談を致せし二十日が戰局今日、狀況二於、
國家最高機關トニテ政府、組織性格ハドウシテ天
之盡テハイケナリ思フヨコテ御許ヲ得テ大本營
ニ到ニシト二月十九日軍事指導ニシテ自今モ意見ヲ云
アテニシカガトニ元老分子行ハタレトウカシモ之カズハ
大本營當内閣戰爭指導内閣ニシバイケレバイケナリコテ
先月、赤須米内上毛詰テ放送云フコトモ考ヘラル
力改造ニテ強化サシタ試カナカラ之モ考ヘモダト
種々詔令シ申候、先月末ニ陛下ニモ御詔申上次
第十一室時、第二回大臣會議中旬ニ開催
スル云フ考ヘモアリ沖繩、戰況等ニ鑑、月未位
ニハ進退ヲ來シタシト考ヘテ居、トコロ第二
回大臣會議中立スコトナリ之二代ル大臣會議
ノ目下調査申タル、ニニス沖繩、戰況ニ數月ヲ
要ニヤ知ズ偶、陸軍ニ於テ防衛態勢強化、
爲メ松山烟西元帥カ總司令官ニテセルコトナリ
従フ、阿南大將ヲ陸相ニ奏請スルトコトアリ
古日、実現シタリト、コトアリタソウスルト今
此、文達ヲ認ミテシカニテ月末ニ總辭職スルハ如何
モ裏切、様形トナリ、アリ日米内海相トモ相
談、上別紙、様理由ニシテ總辭職シタリトノト
ナリ

No 3

Doc 1632 W (17)

ヨウテノ時決行セラルヤト間ニシテ御都合次第、
今日臨時閣議開キ辞表ヲ取體メ詮カトコトナ
リシ故餘リ穴天然。仰上ハ御奉ヘ遊ル、時限モ
ナキ故明朝トセラシテ人也可ト話シ同意ヲ得テ
ヨウテ二時四十五分拜謁右趣ニ奏上ス尙令向ハ重
臣、會同ニ先内大臣ニ於陸海兩大臣而總長
上會見改度旨言上御許シ得タリ

東西政戰西局、變轉二半ニ至國事能益之局
急ヲ加ヘ今ヤ戰線天鏡後キ又統帥モ國務正ニ
差リカラス公私ノ秋沙同領、組織性格モ亦以此事
態ニ適應スルカ如ク抜本的政要ヲ加ヘ萬民士共
ニ志シ前ニシテ輔弼ノ大任完遂ニ當任スヘキ彈
力ナシモ、クラサルヘカラサルヲ自覺シ謹シテ該管
ヨ乞ニ奉リ總辭職ヲ決行スルコトセリ

Reprocessed pursuant to order,
Court Record, p. 11,351.

rx 1282

0.4.5 /T.N. Probably April 5th/

Interviewed Navy Minister YONAI at 11:55 A.M. In general, I asked him the same thing I inquired of Chief of the General Staff UMEZU. His conclusion was that although it is called a powerful cabinet, nothing in particular could be thought of. Since Navy Minister YONAI is one of the senior statesmen /JUSHIN/ I took this opportunity to ask his opinions regarding the succeeding premier. He approved of Admiral Kintaro SUZUKI.

Furthermore, regarding the successor to the Naval Minister, he confided to me that since Vice-Admiral Seibi INOUYE would not accept by all means, he decided to recommend Admiral HASEGAWA.

Interviewed War Minister SUGIYAMA at 1:00 P.M. In general, I said the same thing I inquired of the Chief of General Staff UMEZU.

The War Minister said that viewed from his own experience, the unification of supreme command and state affairs with one man holding concurrently several posts, it cannot, factually, produce results. It is impossible. The perspective of war is extremely difficult as seen from the shortages in material and the difficulties of transportation. It could be surmised that the U.S.S.R. may loudly make proposal for peace after she defeats Germany. I think it is necessary for us to make preparations beforehand with consideration to the effect whether the U.S.S.R. would attempt it independently or together with Britain and the U.S. at this opportune moment when the war situation is favourable (the OKINAWA Operation) or at an unfavourable moment when she may attempt it independently or in combination. UMEZU is the best qualified person for the succeeding Premier from the Army.

At 2:00 P.M., I had an interview with OIKAWA, Chief of the Naval General Staff. Questions I asked him were about the same as that asked of UMEZU, Chief of the Army General Staff.

OIKAWA, Chief of the Naval General Staff registered shock upon hearing of the resignation of the cabinet and so forth, and frankly stated that it was bad at such a critical time. Speaking about the future prospect of the war, he stated that up to about the MARIANA Line, although the difference in strength between our forces and that of the enemy was considerable, nevertheless, we fought a regular war. However, it was later continued under guerrilla warfare. That it was a big stake can also be said.

TOJO: Frequent changing of cabinets in war time is deplorable. I think the San Francisco Conference on April 25 is especially the most important period. The cabinet to be formed should be the final one. Within the country at present, there exists, on one hand, the opinion that we should fight to the last to provide for future developments of the country and on the other hand, the opinion to accept the unconditional surrender terms to restore peace immediately. I think it is necessary to decide on this first.

1. OKADA: The new cabinet to be formed must consider a great number of problems. It must be a cabinet that will shoulder the destiny of the country till the very end and a cabinet that will solidly combine the total power of the country. Such a problem as war or peace can be determined only at a later stage. I believe we must first carefully study these problems before determining this question.

HIRANUMA: As their Excellencies have said, the acute war situation today has given rise to various opinions which must be unified. There is no way out but to fight to the end. That problem, I think, is simple. Frankly, I am bewildered because of this sudden political change and it would have been desirable not to have replied to the Throne immediately as in previous cases. I wish we could also have heard carefully, if possible, the opinions of Ministers KOISO and YONAI but since the resignations /1.58/ have been tendered /T.N.--word "tendered" obliterated/ it is too late. Frankly, since my opinions are being presented without any preparation, I do not have sufficient grounds to back up my contentions. I suggest that we carefully discuss such problems as their Excellencies have presented.

KIDO: I am quite of the same opinion. The fact is that for a time it appeared as if a total resignation would occur but I heard thereafter that it was changed to the policy of reorganizing and both Field Marshals, SUGIYAMA and HATA, were to be transferred to the posts of Commanders-in-Chief of the General Defence Commands. Accompanying this, it became necessary to change the War Minister, and therefore, the Army offered to the cabinet, General ANAMI as its successor. Premier KOISO states that to effect reorganization now and then to execute a total resignation a little later on would be betraying the Army. (Personally I do not know what is meant by this.) So that is why he made up his mind so suddenly, which is really so sudden and I, myself, am much perplexed.

KIDO: As Mr. HIRANUMA says, it means that after the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal makes a recommendation to the Emperor, he must not interfere with the organization of the cabinet. It is very strange that if the organization of the cabinet is unsatisfactory, he who made the recommendation will be held responsible. Therefore, I think that as a system it is poor. However, at the present time, there is no alternative, and therefore, we cannot help but be resigned to accept this system.

HIRANUMA: I think that it is unreasonable that the responsibility should be taken by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, alone, and that we must also share the responsibility. To this end, I think that it is best that the one who organizes a cabinet should seek more advice.

OKADA: Some people say that considerable surplus power still exists in our country and ask why we do not utilize this potential fighting power. Before amassing the total power of military officials, government officials, and civilians, unity among the leaders is strongly desired. It is necessary that we study as to whether the procedure we have followed until today, is right or wrong.

HIRANUMA: After the decision is made in this room and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal makes an informal report to the Throne, a situation would develop where he cannot interfere. As for telling him to do as he pleases, I wonder.

KONOYE: Although you are right, the problem is in what form it should be carried out.

KIDO: There are many who desire a firmer unity among the leaders.

HIRANUMA: Setting aside discussions from the legislative and constitutional standpoints, I think it is better to have closer contact in the organization of the cabinet since the responsibility must be assumed.

OKADA: I agree.

SUZUKI: I think that there is no necessity of fixing a limit on the scope of the Emperor's summons. I would like to ask the opinion of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. I remember to the effect that whenever the occasion demanded, Prince SATONJI sought the advices of Count YAMAMOTO and Fleet-Admiral TOGO. After obtaining the Emperor's consent, should we solicit the views of Count MAKINO?

HIRANUMA: At the least, he must be in the first or second reserve.

SUZUKI: At the time of the Sino-Japanese War we had Premier ITO. The Premier need not always be a soldier.

HIRANUMA: Practically speaking, the Premier will not understand war, unless he was a soldier at least in the first or second reserve. Nevertheless, the premise is that, if it is to be fought, it must be fought out.

OKADA: Through the conversations carried until now, it seems that the character of the Premier, in general, is distinctive.

KONOYE: Then we may conclude that he must be a soldier either in the first or second reserve who will fight it out.

HIRANUMA: I hope no one will say that it is improper at this time, such as said by Mr. WAKATSUKI.

WAKATSUKI: Actually, I am unqualified. I fear that I may say something thoughtless. The question is not of a man who will fight it out to a final victory. If we propose peace now, it will evidently lead to unconditional surrender.

HIRANUMA: From the relations between supreme command and state affairs, I think, we need a man from the Army or the Navy, but not necessarily in active service.

WAKATSUKI: The fundamental principle has been clarified but how about its application?

HIRANUMA: What is Prince KONOYE's opinion?

KONOYE: A person that has had no connection hitherto should be recommended.

HIRANUMA: It must be necessary that the person has had no connection and that he can be relied upon, as seen from the public and people.

WAKATSUKI: On the previous occasion, it was decided to be from the Army and although a certain person was named, he was not selected. Today, it can be either from the Army or Navy. What is your opinion, Mr. OKADA?

OKADA: My mental vision is also narrow but gathered here are men from a wide field so a competent man can be selected.

WAKATSUKI: Does the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal approve of this measure?

KIDO: Yes.

WAKATSUKI: What is your opinion?

KIDO: In the first place, since it is my duty here to listen to your opinions, I wish you would state your unreserved opinions. What is your opinion Mr. SUZUKI?

SUZUKI: How would it be if the hitherto Senior Statesmen make an effort. We have the responsibility and are prepared to die for the country. The resolution to die fighting for the Emperor is necessary. Since the Premier must be physically strong to stand the strain, I suggest Prince KONOYE who is the youngest. After that, we all will try. How about the four trying first? I have heard that previously President /of the Privy Council/ HARA also made this suggestion. A week before the former President /of the Privy Council/ died, I intimately heard him talk on this subject and I recall being greatly impressed. I suggest he accept by all means.

KONOYE: Then it differs from aforementioned fundamental principle.

HIRANUMA: The candidate should be a military man. I also agree with Prince KONOYE in that the new premier should be one with no previous connections. With the purport of winning the confidence of the people in mind, it is my wish to have Admiral SUZUKI accept the premiership. As in the past, shall we appoint him after consulting him? In the present situation, is this procedure proper or is it not? I think it is proper to have him appointed by submitting the Ministerial Scroll to His Majesty without consulting him.

WAKATSUKI: Wasn't it so until now?

HIROTA: That is, there is no need of having the consent of the person himself.

No. 1

1632W(118)

木戸侯日記ヨリ、抜萃
昭和二十年四月五日

△

四月五日木 晴

午前十時半 小磯首相參内辞表ヲ捧呈入

十時四十五分ヨリ同五十五分迄拜謁小磯首相、辞表ヲ持見入

十二時 小磯首相來室登表、時期等ニキ打合セ大体午後七時、
二二ス上云フコトトス

豫テ大官長ト打合セタル通リ十一時三十五分梅津參謀總長、

十時五十五分米内海相一時杉山陸相二時及川軍令部總長上別紙、
通リ面談入

十三時五十五分警戒警報發令セラル

二時五十五分ヨリ三時十五分迄御文庫ニア平謁

三時三十分國大將來室面談

五時ヨリ八時迄拜謁、向ラ拜謁重臣會議、催入若槻男爵車送
着、為午後六時ヨリ參加セラル

終了後御詫メヲ頂戴入

八時半鈴木杞相ト懇談入

八時四十五分ヨリ九時十五分迄拜謁(御文庫)重臣、要向ヲ詳細

言上鈴木貫太郎男二太命ヲ降サレ可然思量不旨奉答入

十時鈴木大將二太命体下洋後、上末室便、懇談入十四時歸宅。

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

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二〇、四、五

午前十時半梅津参謀總長來訪ア求ナ左一通り會見ス
 本日小磯首相辭表ヲ捧呈セラレタル其理由、戰局、現状ニ鑑ミ内閣
 /組織性格ヲ改變シ強力ナルモ、タラシメサルベカラスト云フニアリ換言
 スレバ大本營内閣或ハ戰爭指導内閣ナラサルベカラスト云フニアリ此ノ
 点ニツキ統帥部トシテ何カ御考へ御希望ガアルナレハ何ヒタシ尚戰爭
 /見透獨乙ノ崩壊桑港會議ニヨル政治攻勢等ヲ目標トシテ一御
 考ヘモ伺ヒタシ

一、戰爭ノ見透ハ洋縄モ中々、苦戦アリ見透ハ決シア良好トハ云
 ヘサルモ復、敵ヲ擊撃シ得ルト否トニ拘ヘラズ飽迄戦フノ態勢力
 ニテ進マサルベカラズ又此事ハ國民、志氣昂揚セラレ全力ヲ發揮シ
 得レバ容易ニハアラサルモ不可能トハ思ハズ此点ハ軍一トシテ着々進
 メツツアリ依ツテ之ニ要求ニ適合スルク如キ内閣ノ組織セラシシコト
 ヲ切望スソレニハ前大戰、際各國ノ採リタル戰時内閣少數内閣制ヲ
 採用スルモ一案ナラン而シ要ハ人ナリ

一、大本營内閣戰爭指導内閣等ハ一應考ヘラル、モ統帥ト國務ヲ一緒
 ニスルト云フコトハ困難ナリ

一、油ガ一番心配ナルヶ數ヶ月ハアリ目下御許ヲ得テ特殊、隊ヲ編成シ内
 地ニテ据ルフトセリ現在、倍位増産シタシ

No. 3

1632W(118)

二〇・四・五.

午前十一時五十五分米内海相面面談

大体梅津總長ニ尊ニタルト同様、コトヲ尊又、強力内閣ト云フモ別ニ特別ナルコト考ヘラレズト、結論ナリ米内海相ハ重臣ノ一人ナル故此機会ニ後繼首班ニツキ考ヘラ聴フ鈴木貞太郎大將ニハ賀成ナリキ尚海軍大臣、後任ニハ井上成美中將がドウシテモ受ケナイ故長谷川大將ヲ推スコトセリトノ内話アリタリ

午後一時杉山陸相ト会談

大体梅津總長ニ尊ニタルト同様、コトヲ述ア
陸相ハ自己ノ体験ヲリ見テモ一人力數役ヲ兼ニタル統帥ト國務、統合ハラリ実賓續舉ヲズ不可ナリ。

戰爭、見透ハ物、不足輸送難等ヨリ見テ頗ル困難ナリ蘇聯カ強ヲ倒シタル後ハ大キフ平和提唱アナスニアラズヤトモ考ヘラル之ヲ單獨テヤルカ、英米ト共ニヤル方此機會ニ處シテノ戰局ノ良好ナル場合（沖繩作戰等）、惡キ場合、單獨、場合連合セル場合等ヲ考慮ニレ豫備スル、要アリト思フ。

陸軍カラノ後繼首班ハ梅津カ最適任アリ

午後二時及リ軍令部總長ト面談

梅津總長ニ語シタルト大体同様、コトヲ尊又

及リ總長ハ内閣總辭職云ミテ聽キタルトキハ卒直ニ申セバ大事十時ニ因ツタコトダントショツフア受ケタリ。

戰爭ノ見透ア云ヘ大体マリアナ線迄ハ彼我ノ勢力、差ハ相当アリシモ東モ南モ正戰ナリシカ其後ハ奇戦（ゲリラ）ノ連續ナリ、從ツテ

No. 4

1632W(118)

大ナチ賭博トモ云ハル沖縄、戦争ニシテモ辛ニ進落シ得テモノシテ終了スルモノハナリ再び同地ニ來シカ或ハ他ニ向フカ何ニシテモ戰局ハ更ニ深刻ト化ベシ戰力、維持ツイテハ過早ニ宣行スル却ツア遂放果トナルノア時期、見ツクルカ將來ハ海軍、餘ハ兵ヲ工場ニレテカヨ維持シ航空機月産千二百機水艦月二十位、維持シテ奇戦的勢力、發揮ニ努力考ヘテ勿論螺鈿出来スルモノソウ悲觀シタモ、ニアラス但シ而シ之ハ條件アリ即チ守國國民、信賴アリ内閣ニ後ヨリバシヌ事ナリ。

油ハ六月位迄アリ其後ハ松根酒等ニヨヒ行ヘアリ今後ハ國內態勢、崩ルコトガ心配ナリ

大本營一本、内閣トモ黙契ニ政治セヤト云フコト、申々難カシム。ハ、戰争遂行ハ今、形ガ一番ヨイ様ニ思ハシ。

1. 昭和二十年四月五日午後五時ヨリ表挙謁向テ重臣會議、用催人近藤平治、鈴木廣吉

木戸若櫻、園田東條（若櫻四六時ヨリ参加セラル）

一、侍従長挨拶（内大臣ヨリ政變ニ至リ之事情ヲ説明小磯首相、辞表ヲ朗讀聞取入）

一、東條辞表ハ國務總帥何モ是正ア要ストアリ此意味ハ如何

一、木戸小磯首相ヨリハ別段、説明ナカリキ

一、東條、戰時中屢々内閣、交渉スル宜シカラス殊ニ四月二十五日香港會議、内大臣时期上思フ、今度、内閣ハ最後、内閣ヲ丁ケハナラヌ處アリ、今國內ニ最後迄戦役行テ國、將來ノ有ベントスル説ナ無、條件降服アリ甘受シテ早急ニ和平作リ出スシト、諭アリ先ツ之ヲ先決スル事アリト思フ

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一 岡田 今度出来ル内閣ハ非常ニ種々ノコトヲ考ヘサルベカラス 最後迄
國、運命ヲ背負フ内閣ニアリ國、總力ヲ結集スル内閣ナル和戰兩用
ト云フカ如キ問題ハモウシ先ニ行カサレハ判ラヌソレ等ノ事ヲ充分
研究、上次ナケレバナラスト思フ

一 平沼兩閣下ト同様戦局切迫セル今日国内ニハ種々ノ論アリ之ヲ歸一
セシム、要アリ、飽迄戦フ以外ニ途ナシ問題ハ簡單ト考フ餘り突然、
政變ニテ寔ハ当然シテ居ルノト從來、稀ニ急ニ奉答、ト云フコトニナ
ラス様ニシタク、既ニ辭表、數字不明 以上ハ不得止カ露骨ニ云ヘハ何レモ
聽キタク、シカ既ニ辭表、數字不明 計ハス、餘地ナシ、兩閣下
トツサ、向ニ意見ヲ述ブル故充分ニ、數字不明

ノ述ヘラシ様ナ点ヲ充分ニ詰合ヒタキモナリ

一 不戸全フ御同感ナリ寔ハ一時ハ總辭職、模様モアリシニ其後改造ノ方針
ニ変更セラレタル様反聞シ居リタルニ防衛總司令官ニ杉山烟雨元帥カ
轉出セラル、コトトナリ之ニ伴ヒ陸相交送、必要生シタルタメ阿南大將ヲ
後任トシテ陸軍ヨリ内閣へ申出タリ小磯首相ハ今此、改造ヲナシ向モナ
ク總辭職ヲナスト云フコトハ陸軍ヲ裏切ルコトイル(此ノ意味ハ自分
ニハ判ラス)が故ニ急ニ決意セリトノコトデアツテ全ク突發的ニ自分モ
頗ル当惑セシ次オナリ

一 岡田誰々ト云フ前ニ總力結集強力内閣ニツイテ詰合フテハ如何

一 平沼從来ハ首相力先ツ定マリ其ノ首相力固僚ヲ奏請スルコトニナリ
居ルカ今度ハ主ナル閣僚位ハ決定セサレハ強力ナルモノトハナラサルヘシ
陸、海軍治安等在來、例ニヨリテハ結論ニ到達セサルヘシ

一 東條閣僚ヲ吾々カ定メルトキハ組閣後、責任ヲ陛下ガオトリニタルト
云フコトトナニアラサルカ

No. 5

1632 W (118)

一、平沼陛下が直接御命シニナリテハ宣シカラス

一、東條組閣、喜悪力陛下ニ歸ルコトハ避ケタシ

一、平沼形カラ云ヘハ御説通リナルカ自分ハモウシシ吾々ノ意見ヲモ織シテ
決メラレテハ如何ト云フナリ

一、廣田ドウシテモ勝クサルヘカラス悲觀論モアルミ今國ノ戰争ハ各國トモ
始メヨリ勝チ通シタルモノナク皆一度ハ敗ケカケテモリ返ヘセルナリ、次ノ内
閣ハ戰ニ勝抜ク為メノ内閣十ガルヘカラス、由大臣カ軍部ノ首脳者
ト会見セラレタルハ誠ニ至当ナル处置ト思フク今少シ軍部ノ意向ヲ確カ
ムルノ要アルニアラズヤ

木戸相当ニ尊ネタルカ特殊ノ意見ハナカリキ

平沼露骨ニ云ヘハ小磯氏、組閣ハ失敗ト思フ、モウシシ吾々ニモ相談不明
ヘカリシナラン、改造ハ皆露骨ニ云ヘハ失敗ナリ形ノ論ハ東條閣下ノ云ハル
道ナルカ實際ハモウシ理屈ニトラハレス相談アリテ、然ルヘキ

木戸、平沼サンノ云ヘル、通り内大臣モ奏請スル後、組閣ニハロヲ出スナ
ト云ラコトデアリ而クモ之カマズイト奏請ノ責任ヲ云ミサレルノハ誠ニ妙ナ
モノニ制度トシテモ之ヲハイケナイト思フカ今日ハ外ニ方法クナイノテ不
得止実行サレテ居ルト云フ外ナシ

平沼内大臣一人ニ責任ヲトラスノハ無理ヲ吾々モ責任ヲ別クサルベカラスト
思フソレハ組閣者モツト充分相談セラル、ゲ宣シカラント思フ

周囲セ同示ヘ未だ我國ニハ相當餘力ハアル此、強サレタル戰力ヲアセ使ハヌカ
トノ論アリ軍官民、總力結集ノ前ニ上層部ノ一致ノ要ウ切望セラル、
今迄、ヤリ方ニテ宣シキヤ否ヤ檢討ヲ要スヘン

平沼此席予決定シ内大臣カ内奏セラレタル後ハロヲ出セヌト云フコトニテ
ル御勝手ニオヤリナサイニテハ如何ト思フ

No. 7

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近衛御尤カドウ云フ形アスルカ、問題ナリ

木戸上層カモツト一致セヨト、算ハ達命アル

平沼、法利上寛法上、論ハ別トシテ責往ヲトガハカラサル以上モウ

少シ組内ニ事リテ繁密十心連絡ガアリテモ宣シカラン

周田然ナリ

一、鈴木内大臣ニ御尊神ノライガ一体御召ニハ範圍ハシモ固定スル
要ハナリ也。西園寺公等モ時ニ應シ山本伯や東郷元帥、意見
等モ聽クシタコト、ア心様ニ記憶入此際御召ヲ拜シ牧野伯、
意見ア微ナシ人如何

二、木戸御説ハ御尤カドウ今日ヤリ方ハ西園寺公、時ハ黒マテ居ル
テ、數字不明

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東條、内閣、軍事會議、御議題下「國政全般」當レシタル人モ汉ノ事ナ明
テ、御議題上思召何ニ決定、タヒトハ今道ニ參加ルモノト出事、
一層田二層部、一致、該必要ニ牧野伯、如テ元參謀本部會長ト思
内閣が替、其場合最高軍事指導會議、尚存續在ル又、又首相大本
營、列得、小磯文三御許、トシテ、今後内閣總理大臣常
列得、
木戸最高軍事指導會議、首相大本官、参列、以不必要ト、論現
ニ之、將軍考覈七八八問題、次問題、詳細、知リテ、今後内閣
總理大臣、参列、得ルかト考、
東條、首相、准稿、參照者、内閣、防用兵、立会、
於木牧野伯、ハ御説明、判、ハ只牧野伯加ルキ其範圍不明、
トナムトナム、牧野伯同様、省察者、他、ハシテ思、ト大申、
若根、轉表意味、判、又後段、未ハ内閣、性格ヲ述、少々餘程、要ト轉表、
前衛事、餘、突然、考究、不、東條閣下、御説、統帥部、卷ナシ、此、
第、何、モメラドト、思、トテ、前田、時、同様、軍人、ヨリササ
陸軍、海軍、官記、段、旅、行、人如何、
案修、予次之、ハア、ス、陛下、御心構、材料供、奉、意味、
若根、御、ハ、御趣旨、後継内閣、首班、選定、セ、ト、東條モ、不明、
ハルカ如ク、論議、御、也、趣旨、友人、思、且後、役職、ノ、中途、(三月)
平人、方、論議、ハ、問題外、行、過、思、
余木、今若根、御、該、ハ、ハ、合、ハ、運、戰、辛、戰、板、ナ、ス、ソ、ガ、失、
思、節後、逃、内閣、首班、其、真、思、有、人、ハ、ハ、不、適、當、ト、思、
若根、ハ、ナ、意、具、古、人、言、風、考、ナ、
案修、ハ、シテ、前根、ハ、意味、

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木內地久戰場上之人心全體情勢於一國內實實情甚為直截了當也下
「國民心」之政府施政「熱心」「努力」下所謂「本邦」「洋居」「本領」相當時
「食糧」問題生產增加問題治平問題等三項為今歲之三國民信賴
之內容作「日本」之今後的動向相當時現「居心」「本領」注意十分
「本領」「本領」「本領」「本領」「本領」「本領」「本領」「本領」「本領」
考十一

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若櫻自命嘗為二首相矣，洎一歲二十一年，經過居酒頭人，一向和氣全其位，甚不以爲意。居酒頭人懼，至十一月責之，如何稱曰：「方此務以最自信，不論他事也。」此制度自非二字老處，顧以是年平治元年（九九二年）（主要因條子孫鑒定）首班、陪御辭退入外寺，出未可也。十一月，首班、參御起居郎同上。

小職者相，詳表，趣旨為實現出來之名自命；「實見於」二子折樹前固
時之國務，統帥之中心，考之以人情，人言，此非「八十等浙次道」之行
事？標：三進天下如何

若被公前圖自介於此上以次解表主曰若審小體者粗考之則以之為之上以之為之

一、廣田陸海軍大臣、何よりの首領一トトカ可十二

平治國內の戦争統括（主導権）をアーヴィング・マクマホンが取扱つた。

打卦和平論者：推選人能久以，意深于首班人選。每大卦爲休丁，
結局首相是爻之三後，其人位次一言，余卦意見於選二三爻。點掌打卦，智
論：極力反對「形而」公若稷氏，六爻通「十九事」實「別」今卦也。凡卦之十
總力登程，八艮同，有力者，使八卦八爻入

「木猿」者、江戸末世頃十歳の男の子で、かく人

本題圖形一輪廓，關係到的具體現象是什麼？這是一個問題。

9

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一 広田矢張現役下十八回難事情をつぶさに本音三参列許せん
ト吉六心モ現役入ヲ要セス

一 平治少毛豫後備十三サヘルカス

一 鈴木日清時伊藤首相入居ニ心毛軍人要ナシ

一 平治事會立詔ナ少毛豫後備人ナラテハ戰爭力判下ニシテ元
黙々ヤ拔ノ前提

一 岡田今造御詔大体首相性格判ノ様子

一 並衛飽進職ヤハ軍人豫後備主事ニテコトナリ

一 平治若槻氏如次降不適任等ト云ハハハル様頗度

一 若槻事實不適任ト云間ナリトテトヨリ勝手被為
人上人問題アリ今平和詔議スル件件降服拿捕行ヒ
ト分明

一 平治流紳上國務閣僚陸海軍人等ト要人ヤモニ現役
ニ限スル思フ

10/10

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若観大体原則へ判明シテルガニが適用如何

平沼近衛公ノ御意見如何

近衛今迄、仔細カカリノナキ人當ヨシカラ、一

平沼之ハ世尚國民が見テ、行キガカリニ世々一人、信賴、置ケン人

タリ事が肝要ナリ。

若観此前へ陸軍、中ヨリト言ヒ、其本氏ヲ述ベクル、其レハ御珠

用ニテラナカヘタガ今日ハ陸海軍ケヘニテモ東シ、岡田サ

六衛意見如何

岡田、自分ニ眼界ハセマイガ爰ニハ三方面、方モ居ラル故

適任者ヲ云ニ得ズベシ。

若観内大臣ハ方針ニハ同意ナリヤ

木戸、ニカリ

若観御意見如何

木戸、先づ各位、御意見ヲ、承ルガ今日、役目ナレハ隔

意無く御發表願ヒ度ニ、於本サ一、御意見如何、
鈴木、之近、重臣ガ奮發サセテハ如何、國家ニ殉スル、覺
悟責任モアル、御馬前則ニテ討死一覺悟ヲ要ス、首相
眞体ヲ勞スル故一番若キ近衛公ニ願フ、其後皆ニ
ヤル、四人が先づ御奮發ニナリテハ如何、以前原議長ミ
提案ヤラセクリト聞ク、前議長薨去一週日、前親ニテ
御詫ラ聴キ深フ感銘シテハ事ヲ記憶ス、是非ナレ
ム如何。

26/11

近衛、ソシテハ先程、原則トヘ違フ。
平沼、軍人テアハ事、近衛公ハ行懲リ、世人ト云ハシ考之ニ
誠ニ御方ナリ、此一常國民、信賴ヲナシ、意味ニ於不大陸
ニ御引シ又願度布満テスナリ

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從未、如々本人、承諾ヲ得テ任命スルカ、今日一事局ニ適
スハ否ヤ、本令当ラズ擇口主閣員名簿ニヨリ适キニ而任命
トトガカト思ヘ

若松、今迄モ其一通ニアラスヤ、

廣田、本人承諾ノ西モ立シト一事ナリ

若規、内諸ヲ受ヌケニハイカニ云フノカ、

廣田、イカニト言フ誤ミニス、

木戸、自分モ竟見ラ申ヒヅヤシ、又程モ甲ニタル通、今日ハ國內か
戰場トナースル際ナルか故ニ、層々政治一強化が所要ニシニ
國民、信頼フルトシリトニテ、内閣ヲ作ラサルベカラズ。此一意
味ニテ東條閣下、御意見モ甚だ其間へ、が自分ハ此一降伏
木戸下、御奮起ヲ願ヒ度シト考フ

東條、國內か戰場トナースル現死餘程御意ニラナイト、陸軍
カツボラ向ク惧ヒマリ、陸軍ガツボラ向クベ内閣ハ崩壊ス
ハシ。

木戸、陸軍ガツボラ向クト云フ事ハ此、際重大ナリ事ナムが何カキシナク
豫感ナリガアヤ

東條、無一事モナイ、

木戸、先程モ伊セニ通り、今日ハ交軍約一空氣モ相當強シ、國民ガ
シドリ向クト言フ事モアリ得ベシ、

岡田、此一重大事局、大國難ニカリ苟ニテモ大命ヲ拜テル者ニ
討シシテボラ向クトハ何事か、國土防衛ハ誰一、責任カ、陸
海軍ニ非スヤ

更藤、其一點念アルカヒニ御注意アリ、後シト言ヘリ、
若松、合士、穂ナ想念ヲテハ大變不苟ニテモ日本國民ハ以上其平事ハ至頭
矣、事ト信スル、午後ハ夕飯偷

26/12

EX 1283

Doc. No. 1632W (107)

Page 1.

Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary

August 9th, 1945.

..... At 1.30 p.m. Premier SUZUKI called at my office and reported that the Supreme War Guidance Council has decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration on the following conditions:

(1) Preservation of the Imperial Dynasty, (2) Independent evacuation of troops, (3) Handing in our own country of persons responsible for the war, and (4) No guarantee occupation.

**FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361**

RETRN TO ROOM 361



昭和二十年八月九日分

八月九日 水 晴

午前九時大島慶喜貢氏來訪對ソ會議ニツキ詣

フ閣ク

午前九時五十五分ヨリ十時迄御文庫ニテ拜謁ス

ソ據方我國ニ對シ宣戰シ本日ヨリ交戰狀態ニハレ

リ既テハ以局ノ收送ニツキ急遽ニ研究決定ノ事ア

リト志フ故首相ト尤分懇談スル様ニトノ仰アリ幸

ニ今朝首相ト画會ノ約アルヲ以テ區ニ商議スペキ

旨尋答ス

十時十分飾木首相來室依ツテ聖旨ヲ仰ヘ此ノ際宣

ニボツダム宣言ヲ利用シテ駁撃ヲ終特ニ導クノ必

要ヲ力説尙其ノ際事實六ナレバ眞臣ノ意見ヲ明

シタキ思召アリ既テハ豫メ眞臣ニ事態ヲ説明シ置

カル、様依頼ス首相ハ十時半ヨリ最高戰爭會議ヲ

開催態度ヲ決定シタシトノコトニテ辭去セラル

十時五十五分ヨリ十一時四十五分迄御文庫ニテ拜謁

Ex 1200

1.

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2.

鈴木首相ト會見ノ頃末ヲ言上ス

十二時半岩波内閣頭來室追加議算ノ説明ヲ聽ク

一時近衛公來室時局ニツキ懸念ス

一時半鈴木首相來室最高戰爭指導會議ニ於テハ一、
皇室ノ憲憲二、自主的撤兵三、戰爭責任者ノ自國
ニ於テノ處理四、保證占領セザルコトノ條件ヲ
以テボツダム宣言ヲ受諾スルコトニ決セリトノコ
トナリテ

二時武官長來室ソ靖國境戰ノ狀況等ヲ聽ク

二時四十五分高松宮殿下ヨリ御宣ノ電話ニテ條件
附ニテハ聯合國ハ拒絕ト見ルノ處レアリトノ御心
配ニテ右ノ着後策ニツキ御意見アリタリ

三時十分ヨリ三時二十五分迄御文庫ニテ拜謁右ノ
書念等ニツキ言上ス

季錫公先日ノ廣島爆轟ノ際歿死セラレタルヲ以テ
本日同邸ヲ弔問ス

四時直光氏來室四ノ條件ヲ出セハ次第ハ必至ナリ
トノ論ニテ切ニ警處方ヲ希望セラル

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3.

西時三十五分ヨリ正時十分迄御文書ニテ拜謁
六時半歸宅八時零ビ出仕
十時五十分ヨリ十時五十三分迄拜謁内閣ノ職事衆
要更セラレタル件ニツキ言上ス
錦木首相拜謁御前會議開催位ニ右會議ニ平沼相
ト參列ヲ御許シ國フ
十一時二十五分ヨリ十一時三十七分迄拜謁
十一時五十分ヨリ翌二時二十分迄御六庫附鳳室ニ
テ御前會議開催セラレ聖断ニヨリ外務大臣宗タル
皇室天皇統治大權ノ確認ノミヲ伝付トシボツダム
宣言受給ノ旨決定ス